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This article examines some of the challenges to understanding new, non-national
legal configurations as contexts of origin color understandings and evaluations
of legal standards allegedly shared across legal communities. It examines a case
on assisted suicide, Pretty v. U.K., decided by the European Court of Human
Rights. The case illustrates mechanisms of legal integration in the European
court, followed by a process of dis-integration that occurred when the decision
was reported to the French legal community. The French rendition reflected a le-
gal community’s inability to process common law information through civil law
cognitive grids. The article addresses both the capacity of law to internationalize,
and the sorts of comparative inquiries necessary to perceiving what lurks unseen,
as the world experiences superimposed legal norms and claims, some mutually
contradictory. It also discusses the peculiar relation of past to present in the estab-
lishment, evolution and transformation of legal significance. The European court
engaged in decision-making affected by unspoken associations with the Nazi past
that collided with the needs of a society transformed by modern medical tech-
nology. The “remembering” of law that this article addresses thus involves (1)
recompositions of law as it increasingly ignores old borders and categories; and
(2) the ongoing need to examine law’s past meanings in order to understand its
present incarnations and, most importantly, to imagine its potentials in our time
of flux and of increasingly complex and elusive non-national legal constructs.
1À la mémoire de Blanche, ma sœur bien-aimée.  C’est ton œuvre à peine entamée que je
tente de continuer ici.
2Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. My thanks to Francesca Bignami, Ralf
Michaels and the lively students in their seminar at Duke Law School for a helpful discussion of
this paper; to Annelise Riles and Mitchel Lasser for their kind invitation to present this paper at
the Cornell comparative law conference they organized in Paris in July, 2004; to Margaret
Mahoney for comments on an earlier draft; to Linda Tashbook for invaluable assistance in
locating foreign materials; to Justine Stefanelli for her research assistance; and to my dean, David
Herring, for providing a summer grant to support the writing of this article.  Unless otherwise
noted, translations are mine. 
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ABSTRACT
This article examines some of the challenges to understanding new, non-national legal
configurations as contexts of origin color understandings and evaluations of legal standards
allegedly shared across legal communities. It examines a case on assisted suicide, Pretty v. U.K.,
decided by the European Court of Human Rights.  The case illustrates mechanisms of legal
integration in the European court, followed by a process of dis-integration that occurred when the
decision was reported to the French legal community.  The French rendition reflected a legal
community’s inability to process common law information through civil law cognitive grids.
The article addresses both the capacity of law to internationalize, and the sorts of comparative
inquiries necessary to perceiving what lurks unseen, as the world experiences superimposed legal
norms and claims, some mutually contradictory.  It also discusses the peculiar relation of past to
present in the establishment, evolution and transformation of legal significance.  The European
court engaged in decision-making affected by unspoken associations with the Nazi past that
collided with the needs of a society transformed by modern medical technology.  The “re-
membering” of law that this article addresses thus involves (1) recompositions of law as it
increasingly ignores old borders and categories; and (2) the ongoing need to examine law’s past
meanings in order to understand its present incarnations and, most importantly, to imagine its
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3From Le Chaland qui passe, a French song popular in the 1930s.  (“The barge slides
without cease beneath the water of satin/ Where is it headed, towards which dream, which
uncertainty of fate?/... The current always transforms us into wanderers.”)
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VI.  Past and Present
VII.  Conclusion
Le chaland glisse sans trêve sous l’eau de satin
Où s’en va-t-il, vers quel rêve, vers quel incertain du destin?
...Le courant fait de nous toujours des errants3
I.  Introduction
This article addresses the current unprecedented intermingling of laws and legal norms in
our internationalizing world.  It examines in particular the meeting of the common and civil law
in the European Union as an indication of the often unseen and misunderstood issues that lurk
beneath the surface where law joins different communities, and where it meets within them.
These issues are of still greater magnitude when transposed to a global level.  They
involve contexts of origin that produce different understandings of legal standards allegedly
shared across legal cultures, and conflicting approaches to future orientations of law that derive
from unspoken, incompatible ideas about the nature of law and the needs of legal orders.
Comparative analysis is of urgent importance to clarifying the ongoing debates.  It is
needed not just among different legal communities, but also within each, as our world evolves
both through new encounters of laws and legal norms throughout the world, and by transitions
within national legal systems that require continuing recollection and examination of history. 
The “re-membering” of law that this article hopes to shed light on deals with (1) recompositions
of law as it increasingly ignores old borders and categories; and (2) the ongoing need to
remember law’s past meanings in order to understand its present incarnations and imagine its
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art18
4On the “accelerated rate” of evolution in modern civilization, see Henri Marrou, The
Heritage of the Ancient World, 1 CHAPTERS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION 2 (3d ed., Joseph
Rothschild et al., ed.s, Columbia Univ. Press, 1961). 
5Oliver Sacks, In the River of Consciousness, NY REVIEW OF BOOKS, January 15,
2004.(Inner quotation mars omitted).
3
potentials.
II.  Law Like a River
Our time is marked by accelerating transience.4  Transience is the characterizing
condition both of individual life and of history, but its speed and visibility of occurrence are not
constants.  In our era, law is experiencing currents of change at a dizzying pace, increasing the
difficulty of assessing the present.
In studying individual consciousness, the neurologist Oliver Sacks emphasizes the role of
successive, discrete mental imaging as the key to human perception, such that the concept of the
person as a stable entity must be revisited.  Law too cannot be understood without accepting the
centrality of transience to its nature and experience.  But what does a transient nature imply about
continuity?  The past is supplanted, but it does not disappear.  Rather, it functions as an
inescapable and formative frame of reference that processes and defines the present, and the
presently changing, law:
How, if there is only transience, do we achieve continuity?  Our
passing thoughts ... do not wander round like cattle.  Each one is
owned, our own, and bears the brand of this ownership, and each
thought ... is both an owner of the thoughts that went before, and
dies owned, transmitting whatever it reached as its Self to its own
later proprietor ... [W]e consist entirely of a collection of moments,
even though these flow in one another like [a] ... river.5
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
6See MALCOLM E. LINES, FACTS AND SPECULATIONS ABOUT NUMBERS FROM EUCLID TO
THE LATEST COMPUTERS: A NUMBER FOR YOUR THOUGHTS 189-99 (1986).
7See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV.
869 (1993).
8André Tunc, Comparative Law, Peace and Justice, in TWENTIETH CENTURY
COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 80, 83
(Kurt H. Nadelmann et al., ed.s, 1961)
9See, e.g., MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, LES FORCES IMAGINANTES DU DROIT: LE RELATIF
ET L’UNIVERSEL (2004); Daniel Golove, The New Confederalism, 55 STANFORD L.REV. 1697,
1697 (2003).  The profusion of norms is such that drafters of a proposed European civil code
complain of the difficulty “paradoxically ... [of] integrat[ing] the uniform law that already exists”
in addition to devising a code that articulates the commonalities of EU member state laws. 
Christian von Bar, Le Groupe d’études sur un Code civil européen, 53 R.I.D.C. 127, 137 (2001). 
Various sorts of uniform regimes thus intertwine in potential mutual interference.  On the
problem of conflicts between the EU’s human rights regime (1) with that of the member states,
see, e.g., Craig T. Smith& Thomas Fetzer, The Uncertain Limits..., 10 COL. J. EUR. L. 445
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Continuity thus emerges notwithstanding discontinuity, and must be understood as part of
an ongoing process of change, as new moments collect both to displace and to redefine the old
even as they give shape to the present.  But just as mathematics tell us that there can be infinities
of differing sizes,6 there can be newnesses supplanting the old that in some eras are newer in kind
than in other eras, transiences of greater magnitude in some times than in others.  Not only is law
by its nature vulnerable to having “ideological drifts” that both enable and obfuscate changes,7
but, in addition, our era is one of both compounded change and of a compounded obfuscation of
change.
Today, “[t]he various human communities are no longer merely in contact [,t]hey are in a
state of mutual penetration.”8  The legal norms that are multiplying and meeting signify
differently according to context, a context which may be that of nation, or of kind of court, or of
the legal status of the norm in the forum in question.9  Contexts that endow legal standards with
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art18
(2004); and (2) with that of the ECHR, see “Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, EU judges end human
rights law for press, DAILY TELEGRAM, 19 Oct. 2004 at http://tinyurl.com/bkxss>, last visited on
December 3, 2004. For contrasting approaches to the issue of intertwining domains of law on a
non-national level, see Anne Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
183 (1997); A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Delmas-Marty [small bklet, Globalisation
éonomique...] 
10On the one hand, it may be that legal standards which depend on context may be 
capable of objectivity and neutrality in a context-specific sense, as Isaiah Berlin’s work would
imply. Henry Hardy summarizes Berlin’s position over his lifetime on this point in his
introduction to the first volume he edited of Berlin’s correspondence.   See ISAIAH BERLIN
LETTERS 1928-1946, xliii (Henry Hardy, ed., 2004) (Berlin’s pluralist view rejected relativism,
although misinterpretations of his position have confused the two).  On the other hand, neutrality
that may be achievable within a given context, such as a national legal system, may be
unsustainable when the field of application extends to other arenas.  A third alternative may be
that context dependence will suggest that law is subjective at its innermost core.  Law’s
contemporary transitions to increased planetary contacts and claims merely may have rendered
this more visible, and may require us to keep in mind the discomfiting possibility that
contextuality may not be separable from relativism, nor relativism  from subjectivity.
11Habermas has coined the term “post-national” for the EU, a concept that Christian
Joerges specifically endorses with respect to law.  I am reluctant to adopt that term because of
how much remains unknown as to both the depth and nature of the departures from the national
that abound in today’s overlapping legal domains.  The struggle for terms in this area to describe
the current non-national law is reflected in Eric Wyler, “L’internationalité” en droit
international public, 108 REV. GÉN. DE DROIT INT. PUBLIC 633 (2004).  To this list, one now also
may add “sub-national.”  See Stephen Tierney, Reforming Sovereignty?  Sub-State National
Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the Nation-State, 54 INT’L.& COMP. L. Q. 161 (2005).
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various meanings may challenge law’s capacity for objectivity or neutrality. 10
In addressing issues that arise as today’s legal orders intermingle, this article hopes to
debunk some fictions and suggest some facts as to how layers of national and non-national law
can interact in ways often misunderstood because difficult to perceive.  I use the awkward term
“non-national” because I mean that which is “other” to the national, but not precisely
international, supranational, transnational, or necessarily postnational.11
This article examines the dynamic developing between national and non-national law in
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
12MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, LES FORCES IMAGINANTES DU DROIT, supra note –.  For an
extremely interesting analysis of law’s simultaneous globalization and fragmentation through the
lens of Carl Schmitt’s Nomos der Erde, see Martti Koskenniemi, International Law as Political
Theology: How to Read Nomos der Erde?, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 492 (2004).
13See Yves Lequette, Quelques remarques à propos du projet de code civil européen de
M. Von Bar, LE DALLOZ, no. 28, 2202, 2211 (2004) (The EU may undermine and destroy its
vision of future peace if it abandons national distinctions in favor of European legal unification).
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Europe.  The European model is not an exact replica of the interaction between traditional
national and international law.  The internationalizing world is not shifting to a world governed
by international law, but by a panoply of legal phenomena, and in ways specific to innumerable
contextual factors.  While not a mirror for global developments in law, the EU nevertheless is
experiencing some of the challenges that are characteristic of global incorporations of standards
which do not fit within the traditional international law framework.  Its experiences reflect a
certain number and kind of obstacles to understanding law in a world of increasingly mixed and
juxtaposed legal sources, sometimes mutually incompatible, as with principles and claims of
universalism and pluralism, or, as Delmas-Marty puts it in her recent book devoted to the subject,
of the “relative and the universal.”12
An aim of this article is to further and to re-orient current understandings of the national
and non-national in law by scrutinizing the EU’s inner grammar.  To the extent that Europe’s
departure from the nation-state model may presage a new era of socio-political life, the EU may
be both a hallmark of our historical period, and a precedent for the rest of the world to emulate or
avoid, depending on how it unfolds.13
As our world struggles with twin principles of universalism and pluralism, and as inter-,
trans- , supra, and sub-national legal norms increasingly find their way into and among national
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art18
14See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, LES FORCES IMAGINANTES, supra note –, at 7-14.  The
United States has tended to be legally insular, and its resistance to foreign and comparative law is
exemplified by the recent House Resolution disapproving the United States Supreme Court’s use
of “foreign laws and public opinion in their decisions, [and] urging the end of this practice
immediately...”  H.Res. 468 IH, Nov. 21, 2003.  On the other hand, Supreme Court Justices such
as Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sandra Day O’Connor have endorsed comparative
legal approaches to resolve U.S. cases, and the House Resolution was a reaction against this
trend in the Supreme Court’s decision-making.  See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening
Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 45 Sep FED. LAW. 20
(1998);   For the most recent exchange by Supreme Court justices on this issue, see Transcript of
Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer – AU
Washington College of Law, Jan. 13 [2005], available at
<http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2>.  (Last visited Jan. 27
2005).  On issues of international and national law commingling in France as sources of law in
the formation of the French legal system after the Revolution as the new nation state was taking
shape, see JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN, ENTRE NATIONALISME JURIDIQUE ET COMMUNAUTÉ DE DROIT
7-45 (1999).
15See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 183
(1997) (arguing equally against a “liberal internationalist ideal” and a “new medievalism” that
“proclaims the end of the nation state,” id. at 183, and in favor of a disaggregation of the state
into “functionally distinct parts [that] ... are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating
... a new, transgovernmental order.” Id. at 184.  Salughter emphasizes the unofficial manner in
which transgovernmentalism has been evolving.  See id. at 190.  She concludes that
“[t]ransgovernmental networks often promulgate their own rules, but the purpose of those rules is
to enhance the enforcement of national law.” Id. at 191.
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legal systems,14 it becomes crucial to decide the ways and extent to which the national should be
retained and should prevail, and the ways in which it should be eradicated.15  The EU’s uniquely
visible potentials for departing from national aspects of law, and the incipient stage of its
development, make it useful for exploring how future orientations should deal with the nation-
state model, however difficult it may be even to imagine effective alternatives to past
experiences.
This article focuses on issues associated specifically with law, one of which is to decipher
the nature of law’s capacity to internationalize.  It more particularly examines the peculiar
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
16See Christian Joerges, Europeanization as Process: Thoughts on the Europeanization of
Private Law (analyzing law in what he calls a “multi-level [legal] system,” and the EU as a
“multidimensional disaggregation of statehood”) (manuscript on file with author).
17CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 175 (1983)
18See infra, notes – to – and surrounding text.
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dynamic where law purports to have meaning for legal systems with significantly different
underlying cognitive grids.16  It is true, as Clifford Geertz put it, that “[w]hatever law is after, it is
not the whole story,”17 but law is a core part of the story.
Decisions as to future directions in law urgently require an understanding of current
realities.  It is difficult to understand the present in a time of multiple and rapid changes where
non-national models may be externally different but substantively similar to the national, and
vice versa.18  It is a process of decoding a language whose connotations change just as they begin
to acquire meaning, a language in which all of the speakers are among the uninitiated.  This
article seeks to take a step in the interpretive process.
III.  Coinciding
The legal approaches of the EU’s member states correspond to two ideas of law, two
distinctive manners of legal reasoning, and emanate from two modes of intellectual discourse
that have separated the law worlds of Europe in the past.  Some of the presences, absences and
meanings of the common and the civil law that combine in the EU today have been
misinterpreted due to deceptive appearances of surface similarity or difference.
These challenges to legal understanding are still greater on the global level where
normative claims of universal applicability implicitly also contain claims of human-wide
commonality, despite vast separations of geography and historical development throughout the
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art18
19On the proclaimed commonality of legal heritage of the EU member states, see Art. F
(2) TEU [Treaty on the European Union, the Maastricht Agreement]; in the context of the
European Convention in Human Rights, see European Convention, supra note –, Art. 1. 
Slaughter and Helfer argue that the European experience is generalizable to a global scale, but
their point of departure is that the European experience in law is a success story to be emulated. 
See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
20On the advantages of studying the smaller scale, Toynbee was of the view that the
comparatively small scale of the Peloponnesian War was crucial to Thucydides’ success in
analyzing it rationally, and that subsequent eras have profited from his analysis in understanding
the far later and vaster world wars of the twentieth century, see Marrou, supra note –, at 28. 
21Application no. 2346/02. Decision 29/07/2002, 4th section ECHR (hereinafter “ECHR
Pretty”).
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world, covering areas and peoples with far fewer historical and cultural intersections than among
the EU member states.  While the European phenomenon may be different from the global one
precisely because of a more common, shared heritage,19 to the extent that its lack of commonality
(a focus of this article) impedes legal integration, we may conclude that similar interactions are
operating at a still greater magnitude in the larger global context.20
This article examines if two worlds cohabiting within Europe can meet and join in the
law and the courts, or if their forced encounter today is an unmindful collision.  It illustrates this
issue, of still greater magnitude and complexity for global interactions, by examining the case of
Pretty v. the United Kingdom.21  The applicant, dying of a degenerative and incapacitating
disease, had lost her national court actions to procure immunity from prosecution for her spouse
if he were to assist her in committing suicide.  The case’s origins were in the common law courts
of the UK, from which the plaintiff appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”). 
That decision became a source of law, inter alia, to all of the EU’s member states, thus applying
both to the common law state in which it had originated, and to the civil law states of the EU,
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
22European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  See Matthias Hartwig, Much Ado About Human Rights: the
Federal Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of Human RIghts – Part I/II, 6
GERMAN L.J. 5 (2005), at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=600 (recent
discussion of issues of signatory state independence from ECHR decisions).
23La Cour EDH ne reconnaît pas l’existence d’un droit à la mort,  15-16 LA SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE 676 (2003) (hereinafter “Semaine juridique”).
24See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Law and Semiotics, in HIGH FIVES: A TRIP TO SEMIOTICS
(Roberta Kevelson, ed., 1998); Christian Joerges, The Challenge of Europeanization in the
Realm of Private Law, 14 DUJE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 149, 160 (discussing the “many ... versions
of European law”).
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because they all are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights.22
The ECHR decision differed markedly from the manner in which it was understood by
and absorbed into one civil law state: namely, France.  The case’s trajectory illustrates what a
realm of legal encounter between two legal systems both means and does not mean.  The
common law origins of Pretty were absorbed and even extended by the ECHR, as the European
court wrote a bi-methodological decision, demonstrating a genuine convergence of common and
civil law.  France’s rendition of that decision to its national legal community expurgated its
common law attributes, however.23  Pretty illuminates an ongoing dual integration and dis-
integration in law when communities share enacted legal standards that resonate differently
because they are understood through and expressed in distinctive codes, or systems of signs.24
The Pretty case also serves to remind that it is simplistic to assume the continuing
validity of law-processing models when institutional frameworks are modified.  Thus, the
applicability of the supreme court model which national law systems have trained the western
legal mind to associate with judicial constructs no longer is adequate to explain the new legal
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art18
25See Joseph HH Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
26For an analysis of legal integration in the ECJ, see Thijmen Koopman, The Birth of
European Law at the Crossroads of Legal Traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (1991).
27European cases also follow another route, not addressed in this article:  horizontally
signifying for future cases at the peak level of European court law.
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order.25  Despite an official hierarchy that attributes ultimate substantive superiority to European
courts, they are the last fora of appeal without being supreme, because a case’s real trajectory
does not end with its substantive legal resolution if the court of last resort is the ECHR or the
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).
In the step into national legal systems that each case takes after the 
European courts have adjudicated, the peculiar integration of law that is occurring within the
European tribunals26 reverses itself, as national legal cultures process and absorb European court
decisions through the filter of national legal categories, with cognitive grids of civil or common
law creation that do not assimilate information from the other system of legal thinking and
reasoning.  Thus, the “supreme” European courts that formally represent the parties’ ultimate
recourse are only a penultimate level of significance.27
The process of France’s rendition and understanding of the ECHR Pretty decision speaks
to the manner in which law signifies within national legal communities today.  A hidden layer
beneath apparent legal integration reflects resistance to the new that is not willful, but results
from classifications and categorizations that reprocess the non-national through categories
incapable of absorbing the new because the categories themselves have not been altered so as to
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
28For an excellent illustration of how underlying cognitive limitations can impede and
ultimately undermine a legal system’s capacity to adopt foreign law, see Elisabetta Grande,
Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2000). 
29Thus, the specialized practitioners of “European” law do specialized “European” law
reading for their practice.  See, e.g., Andrew Layton, Q.C., M.A. et al., ed.s, EUROPEAN CIVIL
PRACTICE (vol. 1, 2d ed., 2004).  Such works also may wish to garner readers with national legal
practices, but my observation is that this remains a largely aspirational goal to date.  See Lord
Bingham of Cornhill, Forword to id. (Urging the expansion of European law reading to the
national practitioner: “[A]ny civil or commercial practitioner who today handles cases wth what
used to be called ‘a foreign element’ would be well-advised to have [this book] within easy
reach.  There was a time, not so long ago, when national legal systems could regard themselves
as splendidly isolated from those of neighbouring countries, allies and trading partners.  The
world has changed.”)
30See infra, notes – to –, and surrounding text.
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have the capacity to admit the new.28  Legal convergence is like a flickering flame, repeatedly
snuffed out by the air into which it is introduced before it can be ignited.
Member states generally transmit European court decisions to their legal communities in
much the same manner as they present national court decisions.  France is typical in that, despite
the widespread availability of European court decisions in their original form in all member
states, except for specialized practitioners in European law who do read European court decisions
in their original form, lawyers read them after they have been converted into the legal code of
their national system.29  The member states to date consequently have remained entrenched in
their national legal mentality.30
Far from being static themselves, however, the member states’ legal systems are
representative of today’s nation states throughout the world in that they are evolving with time
and multiplying contacts, some due to the EU and others to the astronomical increase in
communication in our time.  The nature of this evolution, however, is not readily apparent, and,
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art18
31See Christian Joerges, Europeanization as a Process:  Thoughts on the Europeanization
of Private Law, 2 (manuscript on file with author) (“the Europeanization of private law should be
seen as a process that triggers disintegration within national private law systems and affects their
systematic consistency”).
32This is disputed by some.  For a recent summary of the debate, see Raffaele Caterina,
Comparative Law and the Cognitive Revolution, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1501, 1505-09.
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perhaps most significantly, is the more elusive to official control for being poorly identified. 
Among others, if the national legal reporters and commentators who communicate and analyze
European court decisions are unmindful of the underlying mentality coloring their own analysis,
legal integration will be illusory, or, more accurately, will proceed at a greatly reduced speed, and
in a haphazard progression.  Misunderstandings that undermine legal integration cannot be
equated with preserving national cultural pluralism as envisaged by the EU and its member states
inasmuch as the differences that remain and solidify do not result from choice.31
Pretty also suggests that legal integration and convergence can occur; that they are
occurring in the European courts of the ECHR and ECJ; that the barriers to intercultural legal
communication both are surmountable,32 and have been surmounted in Europe-specific
institutions, such as the ECJ and the ECHR, but nevertheless that national legal systems can long
remain impervious to “others” with which they are joined in name, and in the name of law.  The
presentation of Pretty to the French legal community suggests far less a conscious rejection of
the “other” than an unconscious rejection.  It represents a failure to recognize the ECHR
decision’s common law aspects, rather than an intention to erase them.  Conversely, legal
convergence is taking place within the EU member states, but precisely not where it frequently is
trumpeted by those eager to promote and perceive legal convergence.
IV.  Deceptive Appearances
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
33PAOLO MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 190 (Patrick Del Duca trans., 1992).  I
note with respect to the quoted phrase, as well as to the following quote, see infra note 34, and
surrounding text, that this language is from the first edition of Mengozzi’s book, and is not in his
subsequent, second edition (of 1999).
34Id. 
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As layers of legal norms from non-national sources become superimposed on national
norms, systems may undergo transformations difficult to observe because unintended and not
visibly substantive in nature.  The very expectation that convergence will result from encounter
has caused a tendency to take apparent convergence for the authentic item, while simultaneously
making it more difficult to perceive its occurrence elsewhere.
Contrary to frequent claims, it is illusory that anything like a common law stare decisis
became a part of the EU civil law states when they recognized European court decisions as a
source of law.  Such apparent commonality offers tempting baits for overinterpretation, but is
misleading on closer scrutiny.  A civilian rendition of  the EU legal system’s integration of the
common law rule of following precedents is that Italy and Germany, even internally, actually
have become more common law than the common law states, that they have “transcend[ed] ... the
limits of the common law...”33  because the federal constitutional courts in those countries do not
just view ECJ precedents as binding future similar cases – they view ECJ decisions also as
binding future factually dissimilar cases:
In the living experience of the process of European  integration, as
attests the fact that the German Constitutional Court affirmed that
interpretive decisions ‘bind all the jurisdictions of the Member
States invested by the same question even in different cases,’ there
is growing recognition of the precedential value of Court of Justice
decisions even to factually dissimilar cases.34
What does such a formulation, utterly foreign to a common law ear, mean?  Closer
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art18
35For a detailed discussion of the role of facts in common law systems, see Vivian
Grosswald Curran , Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law, 7 COL. J. EUR. L. 63 (2001).
36See Francesco Mazzotta, Precedents in Italian Law, 9 MSU-DCL J. INT’L. L. 121, 128
(2000).
37See Michele taruffo & Massimo La Torre, Precedent in Italy, in INTERPRETING
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examination reveals a civilian reformulation of stare decisis, and a failure of translation.  The
application of a precedent to a future dissimilar case is a reinsertion of the civil law tradition into
what is being called a common law respect for case law.  It is possible only by way of a
devalorization of the facts of cases, and therefore a rejection of the most central aspect of the
common-law understanding of what case law is:  namely, as fact-based and fact-dependent.35
Similarly, the Italian private-law Supreme Court (Corte di cassazione) also often is
described in comparative law circles as an example of how much convergence the modern era is
seeing between the common law and the civil law.36  This is because in modern Italy, Supreme
Court decisions are recognized as a source of law.  But when we look at how they are a source of
law, we see that Italian lawyers read the Court’s decisions in the form known as the “massime,”
short summaries of the rules of the cases that usually are factually decontextualized, containing
no description of the facts of the case.37  Like its English cognate, “maxim,” the massima is a
normative principle, written in a style similar to that of an article in a civil code, such that
massime cannot spawn the inductive, analogical reasoning that is the hallmark of the common
law.  It comes therefore no longer as a surprise that, when reformulated as civilian, code-like
texts, such alleged “case law” can be applied to future dissimilar cases.
This “civilianization” of case law lies in indissociably linking cases to the civilian
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conception of law as a formulation of prescriptive norms.  A case that is accepted as a source of
law in a civil law state is transformed into a factually decontextualized, normative principle in
order to be deemed “law.” Thus, what a common law lawyer would extract as only one
component of the case:  namely, its rule, becomes the sum total of the case in civil law states
which accept cases as a source of law.  This greatly reduces the capacity of such “case law” for
the intricate analogizing and inductive reasoning that depend on fact-based law, and which are
vital characterizing attributes of the common law concept of “case law.”
Moreover, the civilian understanding of the court’s role in creating “case law” is different
from its common law counterpart.  For the civilian, the courts whose decisions will be a source
of law are performing the civilian judicial task of applying enacted law – a law enacted by those
endowed with legislative powers.38  This is a far cry from the common law idea that courts create
case law through case adjudications, in a dynamic of mutual interaction between living factual
circumstances and analogical reasoning to precedents, so constituted that even governing
legislation, where it exists,39 recedes in importance to a vanishing point next to the preeminent
court opinions that determine law and law’s meaning.40  
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On the other hand, legal convergence has been occurring unobtrusively within member
states in the process by which law is changing.  The supremacy of European law has caused
throughout the EU a method of legal change characteristic of common law systems, and which
represents a break with the most profound civil law idea of what law creation means.41  First, EU
directives are not drafted in a code-like manner to allow civilian states to apply them in habitual
ways, but are far more detailed in style, in the manner of the common law expectation for enacted
law.42  Moreover, in order to remain compliant with EU directives and court decisions, the
member states must change their own internal laws as necessary.43  This process goes against the
civilian idea of law as emanating from a coherent whole.44  It is a common law progression of
specific statutory enactments in reaction to changed circumstances.
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Many civilians are disturbed by this.  As Zimmermann has put it, “[t]his way of
‘europeanizing’ our ... law has been highly unsatisfactory...  We are dealing with no more than
fragments of ... law, inserted ... inorganically, and in a ‘higgledy-piggledy’ fashion, into the
various national legal systems.”45  Another civilian legal scholar writes that this new way of law-
formation is in confrontation with “the established understanding of law.”46  This confrontation is
with the established civil law understanding of law, imbued with an underlying ideology,
reflected in Enlightenment thinking, of applying scientific methods to all areas of study,
including law, privileging the whole, the coherent and interrelatedness, as opposed to the
component part, the particular and the isolated.47  Not surprisingly, there is support for an EU
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civil code, which would be just such an overarching, interrelated whole, embodying the spirit of
the law, as to halt the current manner of progression, and create an all-encompassing tissue of
principles and norms as a retroactively construed point of departure for all future specific legal
developments.48
Indeed, in arguing for a European civil code, the head of the study group to develop a
European civil code, Christian von Bar, attributes the “momentum” for it to a “growing
uneasiness with the many new EU directives which had begun to make deep inroads on ...
national laws,”49 and because “the current ... ‘piecemeal’ approach of directives ... [is]
endangering the quality and coherence of our private law.”50  Elsewhere, von Bar writes that a
European civil code is needed “for the systematic coherence of our private law,”51 reflecting in
civilian manner an unquestioned assumption of the essential role of both system and overall
coherence in the idea of law itself.52
Von Bar’s view is consistent with fierce criticism in France of the new legal progression. 
In the context of domestic anti-terrorism laws enacted to meet specific problems, one French
author criticizes the new evolution as follows:  “The creation of new violations ... also
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corresponds to the inflationist trend in defining crimes:  the enacted law no longer exists to
resolve in a general way; rather, it resolves particular problems ... [but] slid[es] towards a
different conception of criminal law.”53  He emphasizes that law is “there to regulate in a general
manner.”54  Further, he signals by his choice of section subtitle, “The Loss of Essential Frames of
Reference,”55 that the danger of legal evolution by and for the isolated, the particular, and due to
factual occurrences in the life of parties, is nothing less than a danger to the meaning of law.56 
As Portalis explained to the legislators of France, the great lesson that Montesquieu taught in his
Spirit of the Laws, was “never to separate the details from the whole.”57
 Transposed to a planetary level, this same discomfort with piecemeal legal progression
also observed on the world stage permeates Delmas-Marty’s call for a world-wide legal order
that would take stock of, and overcome, the current progression in law which depends on
multiplying “fragments,”58 and that she fears is resulting in “legal world disorder.”59  She
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art18
60Id. (Emphasis added).
61See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Real New World Order, supra note –, at 183; SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).  For a similar structure to global judicial communication, see Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994); –,
A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 191 (2003).
62Slaughter, supra note – [World Aff art], at 184.
63Id. at 183 [Slaughter, Real New World Order].
64See id. at 184 [ Slaughter, [Foreign Affairs]; SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra
note –, at 5-6, 12-15, 18-21, 31, 36-37, 132, 254, 257, 263-9 (discussing state disaggregation).
65Id. at 192
21
emphasizes that a pluralist legal goal must be of “ordered pluralism.”60
Conversely, in what reflects a profoundly common law perspective but is not discussed as
such, Anne-Marie Slaughter describes in glowing and highly optimistic terms contemporary legal
and governmental change on the planetary level, corresponding closely to the “higgledy-
piggledy” and “piecemeal” method so discomfiting to civilian legal scholars.61  She writes that
nation states are “disaggregating into ... functionally separate parts.  These parts – courts,
regulatory agencies, executives and even legislatures – are networking with their counterparts
abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order.”62  
She welcomes this new world order of “transgovernmentalism” based on a proliferation
of piecemeal agreements reached as needed among professional counterparts throughout society,
both private and public, because of how efficiently they produce solutions to ongoing needs as
they present themselves in our “increasingly borderless world ....”63  She applauds the process of
state “disaggregation”64 for its functional benefits, stressing both that “[u]niformity of result and
diversity of means”65 are the hallmark of the new world.  She defends “disaggregation” and
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“transgovernmentalism” against the charge that they diminish democracy and the nation state,
arguing that professional networks operating transgovernmentally are constrained by national
law, and therefore are under the supervision of “national leaders who are accountable to the[ir]
people.”66
Slaughter’s term of “disaggregation” of the state connotes just the sort of autonomous
multiplicity of measures that typifies common law legal development, a law based on case by
case progressions, and on statutes enacted where a particular problem and need are identified,
engendering a statutory solution that wrests a specific problem from judicial control.67  In other
words, it typifies an evolution antithetical to the civilian conception of legal evolution and legal
order proceeding from a cohesive, harmonious whole.  Delmas-Marty sees the profusion of new
norms that are developing spontaneously without an overarching, controlling, coherent set of
rules, as a dangerous normative fragmentation,68 while Slaughter, on the other hand, seeks
principally to allay fears that disaggregation may be correlated with democratic deficits.  Indeed,
her view is that the resulting disaggregation is positive because it puts legal progression in the
hands of the specialists at local levels of decision-making and cooperation, who are best able to
craft particular solutions to the particular problems they themselves encounter.
In contrast, Delmas-Marty fears potential catastrophe from an overall ethical perspective
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where the particular change that impacts an interstate, international arena, need not be
engendered and monitored by an overarching world order.69  She believes that human rights
already are becoming the collateral damage of an ever-growing accumulation of isolated
developments that functionalist goals have spawned, ungoverned by a coherent legal framework
to embody the spirit of law itself.70  Such a process of “higgledy-piggledy” change already may
be inexorable, as Slaughter believes.71  If so, then the attempts to reverse it within the EU by a
new civil code or constitution may be doomed to failure.  Whether inexorable or not, however, it
is the reverse of the civilian conception of law itself.72
With the notable exception of Legrand’s analysis, the debate is not taking place on the
terrain of common - versus civil law, however.73  Neither Slaughter nor Delmas-Marty, nor
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
the potential, of comparison in law, and the mysterious and intriguing links between law and life. 
See Pierre Legrand, The same and the different, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES:  TRADITIONS
AND TRANSITIONS 240 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday, eds., 2003).   But see   Peter Birks,
Roman Law in Twentieth-century Britain, in JURISTS UPROOTED: GERMAN-SPEAKING ÉMIGRÉ
LAWYERS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN 249-268 (Jack Beatson & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds. 2004) (until the decline of Roman law courses in British law schools in the 1960s, all
British-educated lawyers were  familiar with the civilian legal mentality through their study of
Roman law).
74Nor do others in this debate, such as Lequette, von Bar or Mattei.  See Lequette, supra
note –; von Bar, supra note –; Mattei, supra note –.
75See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, Global Jurist Frontiers, vol. 2, No. 1, Art. 1
(2002) , available at <www.bepress.com/gi/frontiers/vol2/iss1/art1> (proponent of European civil
code in order to protect consumers); Lequette, supra note --(opponent , in order to maintain
national traditions deemed essential to cultural identity).
24
others, associate their evaluation in terms of how it typifies a common law versus a civilian
mentality.74  The common law - civil law divide in my view is central to understanding much
about the underlying nature of the debate, however.  Only by understanding the centrality of the
overarching textual legal normative structure to govern each legal act in civilian legal culture can
one understand why Slaughter’s defense of legal disaggregation on the basis of democratic
viability does not address the civilian concern, and why Delmas-Marty’s call for a world order
based on enacted textual law is not shared by Slaughter.
The debate surrounding a European civil code does not deal only with giving European
legal developments the point of departure from, and points of reference within, a European-wide
arena compatible with the the civilian or, alternatively, with the common law understanding of
law.  There are other reasons why scholars favor or oppose a European-wide civil code, and the
positions taken do not all tally with the civilian-common law divide discussed above.75  Some
civil law scholars oppose it because of unrelated priorities that supersede the desire to organize
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the process of law into the civilian idea of coherent law-generation.
This can be seen on the part of French opponents to a European civil code, who, coming
from the more traditional end of the spectrum of civilian legal culture, might have been expected
to be greater proponents of a European-wide legal framework. than their German colleagues.76
Their opposition to a European civil code does not reflect a common law perspective on the
understanding of law, however, but, rather, an attachment to the French Civil Code of such
magnitude as to make them consider the prospect of France’s Civil Code being superseded by a
European code as more dangerous to the integrity of French legal culture than a piecemeal and
therefore disorderly (by civilian standards) progression of law.77  
Indeed, a principal proponent of this view, Yves Lequette, in addition to his primary
concern that a European civil code would be the death knell of French legal culture by overriding
the national code, explicitly argues that a European civil code would subvert law by resulting in
an empowerment of judges (a common law attribute) and thereby undermine legal coherence: 
legal “diversity could well be reintroduced from one country to another at the level of [judicial]
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application,”78  a harm that he assumes a European code should be aspiring to prevent.  Jean
Foyer, former French Minister of Justice and law professor,  believes that an excessive
empowerment of judges already has occurred in European law:
The power of the European Court of Justice in interpreting
European law and that of the European Court of Human Rights are
considerable and – in my opinion – excessive.  Portalis [drafter of
the French Civil Code] said that the judge should  always be ‘under
the legislator’s supervision.’  However, [European] Community
law and the European human rights regime are systems in which
the courts are all-powerful.  The counterbalance of a legislator able
to check their excesses is sorely wanting.79 
Like Lequette, Foyer is hostile to a European civil code under the assumption that it
would undermine France’s Civil Code: “[W]e should be under no illusion: if a European civil
code comes into being,... we will not find in it the concepts of French Law.”80  The view that the
national civil codes of Continental Europe reflect each nation state’s culture in profound ways is
especially strong in France because of the influence of the French code on other civil codes
enacted under the influence of Napoleonic conquests.81  The strong attachment to the Civil Code
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of France, as opposed to a European one, derives from the belief that the European code
inevitably would displace and supplant the French Civil Code notwithstanding European pledges
of preserving national legal cultures to the contrary.82  There is no dearth of French opposition to
the un-civilian elements growing in European law, however.  Rather, the French view tends to
consider a European civil code as an unacceptable solution to the problem.  Conclusions as to the
desirability of a European-wide code thus depend on which priorities the proponent or opponent
privileges.
Ugo Mattei, for instance, prioritizes yet another concern.  Like Lequette, Foyer and
Legrand, who oppose a European civil code, he views the adoption of an EU code as “a dramatic
rupture with the past,”83 but Mattei nevertheless favors its adoption.  He believes that the code is
needed to promote basic fairness, and that failure to enact it will lead to gross injustice to
consumers, and particularly to the poor.84
Mattei and Di Robilant use the term “psychological refusal” to decry scholarly denial of
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the political implications to the debate about the European civil code.85  Their call to a reality
check substantively echoes some of Delmas-Marty’s focus on ethical violations as the collateral
damage of superimposed legal norms meeting outside of an overarching frame of reference, or
legal order.86  Delmas-Marty’s concerns are of a betrayal of basic human rights values as the
predictable and already present danger of failing to establish a world legal order.87  She suggests
a planetary regime of human rights as a kind of civil code of the world, describing the legal
concepts involved as abstract and porous.88  These are the very hallmarks of continental
European civil codes.89
Part of the civilian discomfort with the method of EU law production today concerns the
large quantity of legislative enactments it is spawning.  The civilian legal system’s coherence and
rule of law are considered to have depended on paucity of enacted law since the time of the
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Napoleonic Code of 1804, because only the generalization and abstraction of codified law permit
civil codes to withstand vicissitudes of time.90  Thus, in civilian legal culture, the written law
should avoid specificity and multiplicity precisely because the written should be permanent, and
should transcend time.  The idea is that a profusion of legislation signifies  “useless [enacted]
laws [that then] undermine needed laws.”91
The Enlightenment tenet of an air-tight framework of logic, reason and coherence, also
fundamental to the civilian conception of law,92 is threatened by implosion from a surplus of
legislation.   Writing endows law with a character of permanence,93 but, once written, law
becomes concretized, losing the fluidity of transformative potential that the unwritten preserves. 
Consequently, one of France’s leading journals of legal developments carried a supplement in
November, 2004, criticizing the “inflation” in legislative enactments by drawing attention to the
inevitable character of “permanence” that written law creates.94  As another scholar puts it,
European law “tend[s] to ossify the law.”95  Portalis wrote that “perpetuity is the wish of laws.”96 
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Indeed, the genius of the civilian states has been the vast unsaid within the written, the capacity
for suggestion inherent in codified principles that are abstract and vague, such that law’s
permanence does not undermine the ever-changing needs of society.97
More precisely, as the French legal journal criticism of legislative inflation suggests, the
civilian view of evolving problems is that they rarely justify enacting legislative solutions, since
the text, by virtue of being text, and therefore concrete and permanent, may outlive the problems
and thereby entrap society through written directives that later become senseless.98   As Garapon
and Papadopoulos suggest in their recent book, the foundational civilian mythology of
overarching coherence in a codified law that embodies law’s spirit remains at the root of the
civilian legal culture,99 however many doubts have been cast on the mythology by Continental
European theorists such as Kant, Jhering, Kantorowicz and Ehrlich in Germany, and by Lambert,
Gény and Saleilles in France.100
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Another component of the civilian concern that has not surfaced explicitly, but that I
believe to be a deeply disturbing factor to many today, is that the profusion of EU law, in turn
spawning a profusion of domestic law, is associated in the civilian mind with being anti-law
because it was a characteristic of the fascist period in Europe that preceded the formation of the
EU.  The fascist dictatorships enacted a huge number of laws, constructing a legalistic façade that
hid the profoundly unlawful nature of the laws themselves:101  “The system inaugurated a
government of men, not of laws, although it operated through a constant effusion of new
statutes.”102  Today, statutory profusion has acquired a lurking association in the civilian legal
mind with the end of the rule of law.
Thus, a supranational civil code, the latter itself a kind of economic and cultural
constitution of Europe,103 would accomplish several civilian objectives.  If approved by all
member states, it would ensure that an overarching, cohesive system engenders particular legal
consequences; that legal developments are not the byproducts of circumstances, rather than part
and parcel of a well thought-out scheme; and that its coherent framework would be a bulwark
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against an end to the rule of law, reversing the current pattern of ever-growing numbers of
statutory enactments due to European requirements, but not emanating from a reliable cohesive
text.
Because the new European process of piecemeal legal evolution has not been recognized
by its opponents as common law in nature, and indeed came about without being intended as
such, its rejection by civil law scholars has not been associated with any semblance of overt
rejection of the common law as a worthy legal partner.  The criticism of a “higgledy-piggledy”
process therefore does not take into consideration that the current pattern of legal evolution is
rich in potential for increased legal integration, and for bringing together the two law worlds of
Europe in an unexpected way.
V.  Legal Integration and Dis-Integration:  The Pretty Case
In the ECHR Pretty decision, the space of encounter between the common and civil law
systems led to an interplay of convergence and non-convergence.104  The ECHR set forth, in
prototypical civil-law style, the texts of the governing law, since the civilian concept of law is a
written text that applies to the case:  here the European Convention on Human Rights.105 
Because the ECHR had to decide if the English courts had violated the Convention, the Court
also looked at the various UK court opinions in Pretty that had preceded the applicant’s appeal to
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the ECHR, as well as at the ECHR’s own past decisions.106
With respect to a number of cases it cited and discussed, the ECHR extracted a factually
decontextualized, abstract, normative rule only.107  This reasoning exemplifies the civilian
conception of case law, and is compatible with a civilian reconceptualization of stare decisis as a
doctrine which may operate as an application of prior court decisions, recognized as sources of
law, even to future dissimilar case situations.108  In addition to applying abstract principles from
past cases, however, the ECHR also reproduced long quotes from the House of Lords, and
thereby automatically engaged vicariously or metatextually in the inductive, analogical reasoning
process of the common law courts that had adjudicated the case domestically.109
The ECHR then also proceeded to reason analogically on its own, however, focusing on
the Rodriguez case.110  In discussing Rodriguez, the ECHR engaged in reasoning antithetical to
the civil law system rooted in the text of the enacted law deemed to govern the case at bar,
because the court that had decided Rodriguez had not been interpreting the European Convention
on Human Rights, the text the ECHR was applying in Pretty.  Rodriguez had been decided under
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the Canadian Charter.111  The ECHR explicitly signalled this, thus indicating its own departure
into the waters of common law reasoning by factual analogy.  It explained its view that
Rodriguez was relevant to Pretty in the most quintessential of common law terms: because
Rodriguez “concerned a not dissimilar situation to the present.”112
The ECHR upheld the UK’s refusal to apply to assisted suicide a domestic UK statute
that had legalized suicide itself.113  The ECHR found that the UK’s refusal to immunize the
applicant’s husband from future prosecution should he assist her in committing suicide did not
constitute a violation of such fundamental European Convention principles as the right to life;114
the right to be free from inhumane or degrading treatment;115 the right to self-determination;116
the right to freedom of belief;117 and the right of the disabled to be free from discriminatory
treatment.118  The ECHR emphasized that sanctity of life and the respect for human dignity are
foundational principles of the Convention,119 upholding the UK position that “[t]he sanctity of
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life entails its inviolability by an outsider.”120  The applicant’s husband could be deemed such an
outsider.
The impact of the ECHR’s convergent, bi-methodological Pretty decision was not the end
of the story, however.  The final step always is local, where European law is brought into its
concrete applications.  Most lawyers in the EU have domestic practices, and read European court
decisions to the extent that they affect national law in general, and their own practice of law in
particular.  They follow European law by reading the regular, national law publications they are
used to reading to keep abreast of national court decisions.  Since EU membership, these
publications  now also include renditions and analyses of European law, including ECHR and
ECJ decisions.121  The French case law publication from which many in the French legal
community received notice of the case is La Semaine juridique.122  The purported reporting and
presentation of the ECHR Pretty decision in that publication considerably distorted it due to
(1) the highly excerpted format in which the ECHR decision was reproduced; and (2) the thick
filter of interpretation that characterized the French legal commentary.
The French write-up was an entirely civil law analysis.  The first aspect of the European
legal dis-integration, or retreat into the national, was the French publication’s translation of the
ECHR decision in so abridged a form as to be of a length typical for a French national court
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decision.  The ECHR decision of over forty pages was abridged into fewer than four pages.123
Because European court decisions are many times longer than typical French court decisions,
they are reproduced in French publications of court decisions only in excerpted form.  By
contrast, the typically far shorter decisions of French court generally are reproduced in toto. 
Thus, the shortening of the European court decision was the first step in the rendering familiar of
European law to the French legal community.
The choice of which ECHR passages to excerpt and which to elide was the second
national, civilian filter applied to Pretty.  The abridged version of the ECHR decision deleted
virtually all of the common law aspects of the original decision.  Where a French summary of the
ECHR decision referred to cases the ECHR had analyzed, it did so in terms of factually
decontextualized, normative rules, very much like the massime of the Italian private law Supreme
Court discussed above.124  Thus, the choice of which ECHR passages to reproduce and which to
elide became a civilian filter in the way it was applied to Pretty.  Consequently, even though the
French publication of Pretty purported to be an abridged French translation of the original
ECHR text, the French publication reads in a very different way, and, moreover, in the same way
that national French court decisions read.
As is the customary manner of presenting national court decisions in civil law systems,
the French scholar also gave her own critique.125  This involved an independent analysis of the
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European Convention’s application to the legal theories and arguments.  The critique seems to a
common law reader to be like a court analysis, as though the scholar were now the court.126 
Moreover, since the scholarly critique follows the summary of the ECHR’s decision, by its very
position it implicitly suggests that it is the last word, of greater analytical authority than the
ECHR’s analysis, as indeed it will be within the French legal system, since the judges who apply
the ECHR case to future French cases will be looking to the scholarly commentary as to how it
should be applied.127
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The French scholar approved the ECHR’s ruling against the applicant, but was severely
critical of the Court for relying on prior cases.  Without a glimmer of recognition that anything
common law had occurred, the French scholar wrote:  “It seems that it is a case decision ... rather
than a well-thought-out analysis [“plus qu’une analyse réfléchie”] that persuaded the European
judges,”128 as though the two were of a mutually exclusive nature.  Indeed, the French phrase also
might be translated as “rather than a considered analysis,” because the words connote that an
analysis based on a prior case is not “thought-out” or “considered” at all in any legally valid
sense.
The French scholar also was scandalized by the ECHR’s suggesting that, although the UK
was not obliged to give advance immunity from prosecution to the applicant’s spouse, it also
would not be obliged to prosecute him.129  Indeed, the ECHR had said that the UK’s denial of
immunity from prosecution should be upheld in part because the UK had made clear that it might
choose not to prosecute Mr. Pretty.130
The French commentator wrote of this:  “Is the [European] Court giving us to understand
that failure to apply the law can be an answer ...?”131  This would be incompatible with the
civilian concept of the supremacy of the law-text, of the supremacy of legislature over the courts,
of, in short, the civilian court’s most immutable and fundamental duty as being to apply laws that
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others have enacted.  Indeed, the French tradition was that the courts were obliged to apply the
law “even if one can not discern its reason.”132
The French scholar pursued as follows:  “We prefer to believe that this [apparent ECHR
approval of failing to apply the law] is not the case ....”133 and that such unacceptable reasoning
on the part of the ECHR “would be beyond the thinking of the European judges.”134  The French
author made clear that, if there should be any leeway by courts, it is not to fail to prosecute, but
that they need not actually punish anyone.135  This quintessentially civilian perspective was
reflected in the comments of a physician at Paris’ Cochin hospital on euthanasia:  “Justice must
adjudicate cases like that of Dr. Chaussoy [who admitted to administering the lethal dose to
tetraplegic Vincent Humbert136] with clemency, by imposing a punishment [only] of principle,
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but he must be tried.  The law is ‘all or nothing.’”137
Antoine Garapon, for many years a judge in France, has commented that, in civilian legal
culture, the “very objective of law ... lies in its symbolic expression rather than its application in
reality.  This is why the distortion, in France, between the rigidity of law and the versatility of its
practice is confusing [to the common law world].  ‘A stiff rule, a soft practice,’ said the great
Tocqueville.”138
This widespread civilian outlook can be seen in Germany as well.  In 2004, more than
fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin wall, former East German guards were convicted for the
deaths of people trying to flee west before reunification:  “but the men won’t be punished, the
judge said.”139  The civilian requirement that courts apply all enacted law in what, to a common
law eye, seems to be in name rather than in deed, also can be seen in the German Federal
Constitutional Court analysis of a proposed statute to de-penalize, but not -de-criminalize, certain
abortions.140  Similarly, in Italy, even the conscious decision to adopt a common law adversarial
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model to replace Italian criminal procedure stopped short of changing the civilian obligation to
prosecute all violations of the law.141
In the French rendition of Pretty, also typically civilian was the scholar’s sense of
interpretive freedom in her own role.  In describing the applicant’s argument as asking the court
to “forgo applying the law”142 and to “authorize the future commission of [a] crime,”143 the
scholar did not pause to consider how contrary to the applicant’s own account of her claim such a
description might be.
In civil law states, the national law’s coherence comes from a complex fabric in which
the scholar’s voice is an important contributing factor.144  Here, in a process reminiscent of
regression to the mean, the scholar reassimilated the binding case into a civilian mode of
reasoning that rendered it familiar as a “case” to the French legal reader.  In so doing, the ECHR
decision was transformed into a civilian court decision.
Further, the very existence of the civilian tradition of scholar-commentators to present,
explain and critique court decisions plays a crucial role in the meaning of court decisions in
civilian states.145  Even if La Semaine juridique had presented an exact word for word translation
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Clauses Viewed From a Distance, 29 RABELSZEITSCHRIFT 444, 456 (1977).
146See generally on the various aspects of civilian legal culture, DAWSON, ORACLES, supra
note –.
147See Lyndel V. Prott, A Change of Style in French Appellate Judgments,  VII ETUDES DE
LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE 51, 58-66 (1978).
148For an illustration of this situation, see, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran , Politicizing the
Crime Against Humanity: The French Example, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.677, 696 n. 78.
42
of the entire ECHR decision, a decision that was highly detailed and self-explanatory, a French
lawyer with a domestic law practice would not expect to understand Pretty directly from a
court’s writing.  The national lawyer focuses foremost on the scholarly critiques which follow the
texts of court decisions, because civil law scholars play a determinative role in both formulating
and forming the meaning of court decisions, and in transforming them into points of departure to
be followed by future courts, or into discredited approaches for future courts to avoid.146
The origins of the exalted role of scholars in France lie in part in the cryptic style of the
traditional French court decision, such that the text of a court decision was not comprehensible
without explanatory and evaluative commentary.  Under the influence of commissions that have
urged more transparent and explanatory writing by courts, some courts in France have departed
significantly in substance, if not in style, from the traditional one-sentence decisions that could
not be deciphered without scholarly guidance.147  For a lawyer to make use of such a decision
without taking into account the scholarly commentary written about it, however, can be
analogized to the common law peril of citing a case without shepardizing it.148  Civil law national
lawyers are not free to interpret a court decision on their own because the judiciary itself
continues to rely on scholarly interpretation.  This means that predicting the outcome of a future
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case requires knowledge of the scholarly views that the judges will be consulting.
The analogy to shepardizing is of limited accuracy, in the sense that shepardizing serves
to alert a United States common law lawyer to subsequent court action that may have effected a
change in the meaning of an earlier court opinion, whether of reversal, modification, explanation
or the like through a later court’s interpretation of the prior case.  In civilian systems, the initial
meaning and import of a decision is influenced by the input of the non-judicial commentator.  In
other words, for the civilian lawyer, a court decision has insufficient meaning on its own at any
point.149
Finally, in France, the primacy of the scholarly commentator’s interpretations of court
decisions is reflected by the respective physical presentations of the texts the courts write and the
texts the scholars write.  The Semaine juridique publication of the abridged ECHR French
translation of Pretty is in uninvitingly tiny print, with narrowly spaced lines.150  In contrast, the
scholar’s commentary that follows the case is in much larger type, with more generous spacing
between lines.151  The effect is to suggest implicitly that the court decision is difficult to read, and
even that the reader may proceed directly to the scholarly write-up that summarizes and analyzes
it.
Pretty’s journey thus demonstrates that EU legal convergence in supranational
institutions does not necessarily mean legal convergence with the member states’ national legal
cultures.  Failures of cross-cultural legal understanding result from an absence of comparative
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
152See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROr
44 (2004) (“Human rights emerged from the Holocaust”); Jonathan L. Black-Branch, Observing
and Enforcing Human Rights Under the Council of Europe: The Creation of a Permanent Court
of Human Rights, 3 BUFF. J. INT’L. L. 1 (1996).  But see Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of
Human Rights Regimes, 54 INT’L. L. ORG. 217 (2000) (describing the foregoing as the
“ideational” as opposed to the “realist” explanation of the ECHR’s origins, id. at 230, and
offering an intermediate third explanation: namely, that the ECHR and other international human
rights institutions emerged from the effort of leaders of the renewed post-war democracies of
Germany, Italy and France, to ensure the future of democracy in their fragile states through
otherwise counter-intuitive agreements to abdicate national sovereignty in favor of binding
human rights commitments, commitments seen as desirable not so much for their own ethical
value, as for their perceived power to prevent future subversions of the newly installed
democratic systems in the countries that had fallen to fascism.)
44
analysis to elucidate the legal norms underlying the relevant differing legal mentalities that, in
turn, give shape and meaning to legal concepts.
VI.  Past and Present
In addition to having a trajectory suited to clarifying some of the challenges to integrating
law among different legal communities, on a substantive level, the Pretty case elucidates another
hidden mechanism of law.  The case involves the peculiar relation of present to past in the
establishment, evolution and transformation of legal significance.
Europe’s past was a crucial but unspoken subtext of the European court decision in Pretty
because of the issue of assisted suicide.  Perhaps for no part of the post-war European order was
the reaction against the Nazi genocide more of a formative influence than for the European
Convention on Human Rights.152  And perhaps no issue so much as euthanasia, including assisted
suicide, is burdened today by associations with the Hitler past that disturb and sometimes distort
European and indeed all western law, as courts struggle with the unexpected and the
misunderstood.
Hitler explicitly hierarchized life’s value among differently ranked groups, advocating
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art18
153See ROBERT PROCTOR, RACIAL HYGIENE: MEDICINE UNDER THE NAZIS (1988); RAOUL
HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (1967); JAMES M. GLASS, “LIFE
UNWORTHY OF LIFE”: RACIAL PHOBIA AND MASS MURDER IN HITLER’S GERMANY (1997).
154See GLASS, supra last note, at [unpaginated page at start of book] (quoting Dr. Arthur
Guest, Director of Public Health, Ministry of the Interior in the Third Reich, 1935).
155See, e.g., IGNATIEFF, supra note –.
156See European Convention, supra note –.
157See id., art. 2.
158See PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR
TRADITIONAL ETHICS (1994).
45
and for a time practicing euthanasia against certain groups, even within the German population
categorized as Aryan, principally those considered to be physically or mentally defective.153  The
Third Reich proclaimed that “[i]t is the supreme duty of a national state to grant life ... only to the
healthy and hereditarily sound and racially pure ....”154  The lesson post-war western Europe
determined to take from the Hitler years was that henceforth all human life would be considered
equally worthy, and that all human life would be considered sacred.155  This principle was
foundational to the European Convention on Human Rights.156
The ECHR is obliged under the European Convention of Human Rights to uphold life as
the most fundamental value and cornerstone of the Convention.157  Legal claims that state-
sanctioned prolongations of life against the will of the living are themselves a violation of the
right to life take on an increasingly persuasive resonance, however, in our era of previously
unimaginable medical technology, with new realities perturbing the meaning and definition of
life.158
The relevant legal language of the Convention has not changed, and sanctity of life
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therefore continues to be evoked as the mandated standard of law for all signatory states to the
Convention.159  As modern medicine shifted the medical definition of life, the law shifted its own
understanding of life in concert with evolving medical standards, however.160  The sanctity of
life, the apparently clearest and least disputable of legal foundations, is being perturbed as
changes in life’s definitions challenge a law that was meant to be foundational, beyond challenge,
and forever valid, but that increasingly appears antiquated.  In particular, euthanasia and assisted
suicide cases have involved patients defined as being alive by medical definitions, but with so
few physical functions as to lend credibility to those who plead to end it.161  A closer look at the
ECHR decision reveals that the Court has been swayed by societal transformations, and that it no
longer applies a sanctity of life standard in anything but name.162  In so doing, the ECHR is not
initiating, but, rather, joining, the major judicial trend throughout the western world.163
In proclaiming sanctity of life in Pretty, the ECHR and the French scholar both cite to the
UK Bland case in a decontextualized way, quoting the House of Lords’ statement in Bland that it
was applying sanctity of life as the legal standard.164  In that case, however, the UK courts had
upheld the right of doctors to decide on behalf of a patient in a persistent vegetative state that it
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would be in the patient’s best interests for his feeding tube to be removed because “[t]he
consciousness which is the essential feature of individual personality has departed forever” while
his brain continued to function, such that “there [was] every likelihood that he [would] maintain
his present state of existence for many years to come.”165  The patient himself was not able to
make any judgment or express any opinion.166  The doctor’s measures were categorized as legally
analogous to withholding medical treatment, but what was being withheld was nourishment, not
medicine, and the withholding had as its purpose the death of the patient.167  In legitimating the
doctors’ actions, the House of Lords insisted, contrary to evidence, that it still was adhering to a
sanctity of life standard,168 and it is for that abstractly stated, decontextualized dictum that the
ECHR and the French commentator cite Bland, in true civilian style, with no reference to the
facts of the actual case.169  On the contrary, however, the Bland decision marked, as Peter Singer
has shown, the end of sanctity of life as the legal standard courts apply, and a transition to a
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quality of life standard.170
Under the immutable term “sanctity of life,” a sea change in the meaning of the law
occurred silently.  The decision to withhold nourishment from Bland was justified as being in the
best interests of the patient who otherwise would continue to live in a medical sense, but whose
best interests the court agreed would not be served by such a life.171  The evaluation of whether
Bland’s life was worth continuing thus was the true criterion applied.
This is a legal standard of quality of life.172  To put it another way, to the extent that the
judicial inquiry into whether physical life is of a quality to justify its continuation now has
become essential to understanding and applying the legal standard of sanctity of life, then
sanctity of life has become coterminous with a life of quality.  The legal term, “sanctity of life”
consequently no longer signifies that all physical life is to be deemed sacred, since, on the
contrary, it may be deemed to be of too poor a quality to require preservation.
In Pretty, the ECHR had faced a dual problem:  on the one hand, it struggled with the
age-old difficulty for courts that are governed by textual language no longer appropriate to recent
societal developments; and, on the other hand, the peculiar need to cling to the sanctity of life
standard because of the historical associations that had inspired it.  The specter of Nazi Europe’s
rejection of human life as sacred,173 and biblical teachings’ contrasting insistence on it,174 are
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shared by all the European member states, and were the common heritage of the Convention
drafters.  The ECHR’s resolution of the dilemma was to allow the language of the law to disguise
its meaning.  As Paul de Man put it, “it is the distinctive privilege of language to be able to hide
meaning behind a misleading sign.”175  The history of law is of ample judicial use of this attribute
of language.176
Pretty suggests the need to engage in an open comparative analysis between present and
past, with increased attention to historical antecedents.  The struggle to understand the present is
the search for which comparisons are the most valid and accurate.  To what is the claim of a right
to die most analogous?  Should it be analogized to or differentiated from Hitler’s theory of the
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life of the ill as defective and valueless?  Should it be analogized to or differentiated from the
right of the individual to be independent to choose, to be autonomous, and to be free of state
interference in individual life and death decisions?  Should it be analogized to biblical teachings
of life as sacred even though “life” was itself a different concept in biblical times and long
afterwards, until the advent of modern medicine?  It is far from clear if the ECHR judges
understood the ways in which the past may have influenced their decision-making.
Pretty suggests that one price of insufficient examination of the past in Europe has been
the formation in law of unreflective associations with the past, which in turn have created an
orthodoxy in judicial interpretation that is ill-equipped to adjudicate pressing issues of our time.
The look look backwards unfortunately has become increasingly unpopular in Europe, as though
the EU’s raison d’être of avoiding the evils of the past is ensured of success, as though a new,
permanent triumph of civilization in Europe were among its acquis communautaires,177 rendering
the backward glance not just tedious, but also superfluous.  As a line from a French poem  (“rien
n’est jamais acquis à l’homme”178) implies, in life and history, nothing acquired can be deemed
to have been acquired definitively, and the past forever needs to be revisited for its instructive
potential.   A better understanding of the past in its historical context would improve the
judiciary’s acuity in establishing more valid analogies and distinctions with historical models,
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better enabling it to reconcile current needs and issues with law, without betraying foundational
values.179
Not only did both the ECHR and the French scholar cite Bland for the principle of
sanctity of life, but the French commentator also concluded that the applicant had to lose her
claim because to validate it would be to cause the ill to lack human dignity.180  The scholar wrote
that the ECHR’s decision had done no less than restore human dignity to the dying and
agonizing.181  The problems in the logic of this reasoning may seem apparent, but they are
particularly striking when contrasted with a point to opposite effect that Bruno Bettelheim made
in an essay on Helen Keller and Anne Frank.182  He had been explaining his observations on the
disintegration of the personality during his own imprisonment in a concentration camp, where,
already a trained psychologist, he had concluded that human life does not always retain anything
resembling the core of human identity, as most people conceive of their identifying attributes.183 
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His second point was that the belief that physical life always permits one’s essential personality
to remain intact is a widespread and tenaciously held illusion.184   He explained the wild
popularity of Helen Keller and Anne Frank as their enabling this illusion, and then proceeded to
debunk it through a detailed analysis of the despair Helen Keller revealed in some of her writing,
including private letters; and of the dehumanizing end of Anne Frank’s life, not contained in the
diary that had closed before she was deported to a concentration camp.
Bettelheim’s argument, put into the language of an assisted suicide case like Diane
Pretty’s, was that biological life can be utterly without quality of life, such that to uphold life as
sacred under a “sanctity of life” standard need not be to uphold quality of life.  If Bettelheim was
right, the European Convention’s dual principles of sanctity of life and quality of life may be
pitted against each other irreconcilably.185  The ECHR was more nuanced on this issue than the
French scholarly commentator.  The ECHR acknowledged a tension between quality and sanctity
of life,186 whereas the French commentator saw no justification in the Convention for the modern
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trend to challenge life’s sanctity through calls for legalized euthanasia and assisted suicide.187
Had the ECHR  examined more extensively and actively the historical antecedents of the
Convention, including the Nazi past, its transition to a quality of life legal standard might have
been made more openly, and debated with greater acuity, with more profit for the future.  A
comparative engagement with the past might enable the ECHR to chart a path to a better
understanding of how courts today can respond to the needs of rapidly changing societies,
without betraying the values that legal texts can convey only imperfectly through language.
VII.  Conclusion
Facts and  fictions in our internationalizing world are hard to perceive and to assess
because we evaluate what we are seeing by means of the only frames of reference we can have,
those formed by and for past events, and they impede our ability to detect the new, limiting and
defining our “horizon of interpretation.”188  The “trace”189 of the old is essential to allowing us to
configure the new, such that the absolutely new is “absolutely incognizable.”190
When we try to discern the ever-changing and superimposed legal worlds today, we are
like adults who scrutinize a newborn.  The infant has physical, mental and emotional features,
but, although some individualizing characteristics are observable, they are vague and unformed
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when compared to the precise contours they will acquire with time.  Much later, looking back,
we may see or think we see how the features of the present were prefigured in the first stages of
life, but only retrospectively can we make the connections that would have enabled us to
understand them earlier.  Moreover, even retrospective perception will not make clear how much
of what developed might have taken a different shape, how much was due to inalterable
constitutive ingredients, such as our genetic code, and how much to the particulars of life, to
causalities that were steered by contingent events and by their contingent confluences, those
infinities of variables that make history’s progression seem linked to chaos rather than to plan.
In the present time of particular flux, decision-makers are making readjustments that will
have great impact on the future.  In Europe, the stakes for the future manifestly relating to legal
integration include (1) the extent to which law should be made uniform, which in turn raises
issues of whether legal uniformity can be legitimate; (2) whether legal integration can be
meaningful, or if, rather, it is conceptually incoherent; and (3) whether adopting a European civil
code would signal an undesirable and illegitimate shift in direction away from national legal
autonomy, or if it would be reasonable, worthy and necessary.  On the world stage, similar issues
arise as to whether the tide of transgovernmentalism should be welcomed or stemmed; and
whether the dizzying array of legal standards, texts and claims emerging in ever new
configurations require concerted world action.
Understanding Europe’s law is a vital task today, as it may provide the best model for
understanding the elusive nature of mixtures of the non-national and the national throughout the
world.  An essential part of understanding the present inevitably lies in understanding and
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examining the past.191  To ignore the past is to preclude understanding one’s own time and, it has
been suggested, also to betray it.192
It has been suggested that structural attributes of the modern nation state which
developed since the French Revolution had much to do with the cataclysm of Hitlerism and the
Nazi genocide in Europe, and that genocide should be considered a predictable outcome of all
modern nation states because of that inner, entrenched structural logic which “loads the dice” in
favor of massacres for reasons other than substantive politics or ideology.193  In a review of the
history of law in Europe that seemed nostalgic for a time he had not known himself, Rudolf
Schlesinger evoked the end of the jus commune as beginning with the rise of national
codifications.194  Although Schlesinger never said so explicitly, he may have seen a direct,
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however inadvertent, link between the rise of codification and the pernicious nationalism and
persecution of the “other” that he experienced in his own youth in Nazi Germany.195  Schlesinger
devoted many years to the pursuit of legal “common cores” that might provide a unifying
element for humanity through shared legal values that he believed to reside beneath the surface of
systemic and national differences.196  National civil codes are envisaged, as we have seen above,
as coherent systems of thought and expressions of the entire spirit of the nation’s law.197  Their
ascendancy ended the need for judges to seek counsel outside of their country, and indeed
increasingly made resort to foreign law of questionable legitimacy. 
Phenomena such as national codifications are precisely the sort of inherently innocent
structures that Zygmunt Bauman seeks to identify as related, not culpably, but nevertheless
causally, with modern massacres to the extent that they relate to “technological-bureaucratic
patterns of action and the mentality they institutionalize, generate, sustain and reproduce.”198 
Christian Joerges, one of the few in Europe today who insist on the look backwards as Europe
engages in steering law toward its future, has suggested disconcerting  aspects of the EU as
having unexamined roots in Nazi legal conceptions developed by Carl Schmitt.199
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One may ask today what the best analogy would be to a European civil code.  It simply
might transpose the problem Schlesinger signaled to a wider geographical arena, such that the
nationalization of law now would be widened to a Europeanization of law, but with the potential
for planting new seeds of exclusion in the process, a structural spur to creating a unitary self that
rejects pluralism and a newly defined “other,” adopting a new jus commune, but for Europe only,
rather than for a wider world.200
Bauman emphasizes the dangers of seemingly neutral structures, and the need to study
where structures may lead as they channel the substantive values a society institutionalizes.201  If
he is right, then a substantive emphasis on individual human rights and even the right to life as
cornerstones of the EU’s value system and legal order, and as the cornerstone of universally
acknowledged legal rights in international law, on their own would not represent a future
safeguard for those rights.202  On the other hand, if the modern nation state’s semiotic “grammar”
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is an indispensable causal aspect of genocide, it may be that Europe, through an imaginative and
perceptive reconfiguration by means of its non-national character, can develop structures to resist
such an inner logic of modernity that is embedded in the nation state model.  If it can do so, it
may become a model on a larger, world scale.
The question is vast and intricate, and an unreflective rejection of the nation state model
also may prove disastrous.  As Max Pensky sums it up in his introduction to Habermas’ The
Postnational Constellation, “the nation-state is fading ... [b]ut ... there is no guarantee that [it]
will be replaced by something better.”203  The non-national model may contain the very attributes
that were the most dangerous in the nation state model.  If the non-national proceeds blindly, it
may exacerbate the worst that we have known in the national, loading the dice to favor the
likelihood of human catastrophe even more than occurred within modern nation states.  For
instance, as has been suggested by others, post-nationhood could spell the end of the ground in
which democracy can most easily flourish and thereby increase the chances for autocratic,
undemocratic rule, fulfilling one of the pre-conditions for the destruction of human rights.204
Ever-growing, albeit no longer national, bureaucracies may facilitate, rather than hinder,
the potential for ruthless impersonality that the modern nation state was the first to hone, and that
has been central in perpetrating massacres.205  On the other hand, non-national bureaucratic
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through something particular; only a particular can make the universal known”); and  KWAME
ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY (2005) (discussing similar issues from the
perspective of Mills, whom Berlin also discussed at length in the sources cited above).
208What Is a People, in HABERMAS, supra note –, at 18.  Cf.  Anne-Marie Slaughter, A
Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 191, 215 (“Communities may gradually
emerge, but they require construction”).
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structures’ coexistence with national counterparts may reduce this danger.206  Objectives of
cultural pluralism, dedicated to preserving the national, may militate against harmony and
coexistence, or, on the contrary, in the context of increased contact, may engender a beneficial
convergence based on mutual comprehension.  Convergence, whether of law or of other
institutions formerly separated along national lines, may be a disguise for dominance, or may be
the product of a pluralistic blend that reinforces mutuality of respect.207
Habermas’ optimistic vision of a capacity to reformulate in individuals loyalties from
nations to non-national configurations, as in earlier times loyalty to nation developed in modern
states from smaller-scale loyalties (“to village and clan”208), even if accurate, cannot foretell if
such a transfer is desirable or if the loyalty in question, however oriented, is problematic
inherently and will remain unable to expurgate the will to annihilate the “other” that in the past
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the twentieth century’s tragic historical consequences of collective identity as the necessary
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on occasion accompanied loyalty to nation.
Habermas believes that in Europe the saving grace is an “otherness” that derives from
unshared national pasts, and that it will persist among Europeans, such that developing loyalty to
the European phenomenon would mean precluding the will to annihilate the other:  “Citizens
who share a common political life also are others to one another, and each is entitled to remain
an Other.”209  If it is successful, the EU may be able to trace a path for itself and the rest of the
world from the flawed and tragic modernity that spawned it into a socio-political phenomenon
that can better perpetuate substantive ideals of human rights and civilization.
Isaiah Berlin’s analysis of the human-wide tendency to create “others” casts some doubt
on Habermas’ optimism.  The emotional depth of the need to create identity by differentiation
from the “other” that Berlin describes does not contradict Habermas’ view that “collective
identities are made, not found,”210 but it casts doubt on whether any collective identity that falls
short of the global, once made, can avoid xenophobia.  It also casts doubt on whether an identity
that claims global proportions can succeed in time in being anything more than superficial, ever
vulnerable to the deep tribal instincts that lead people to crave identities that they forge in a
mutually dependent process of choosing sameness with some, and difference from others.211
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Hardy & Aileen Kelly, eds., Viking Press, 1978).
212MONTESQUIEU THE GREATNESS AND DECADENCE OF THE ROMANS, ch. i, cited in JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT  38 (trans. G.D.H. Cole, 1950).
213See Bignami, supra note –, and sources cited therein
214See ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE (1946).  This has been a principal
theme of some of my past writing.  See Curran, Legalization of Racism, supra note –; Fear of
Formalism, 35 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 101 (2001-2002).
215The phrase is from – ZWEIGERT AND HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 44 (Tony Weir, trans., 1992)
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We also must bear in mind that structures set in place today will steer future
developments less than the decision-makers expect and hope, as well as differently and
unpredictably.  How much stability or predictability institutions can ensure has been a matter of
unresolved debate for centuries.  Montesquieu believed that the foundational moments of
institutions are primordial, because “[a]t the birth of societies, the rulers of Republics establish
institutions and afterwards the institutions mould the rulers.”212  A similar emphasis on the power
of institutions to preserve stability through time and current events infuses the perspective of
historical institutionalism,213 yet history itself seems to suggest a story of far more mutual
interaction in the dynamic between the ever-changing present and the ever-vulnerable institutions
charged with resisting flux.214  The winds of the future are beyond prediction, but the more
penetratingly the past and the present are scrutinized for all that “lurks unseen” within them,215
the better able decision-makers will be to decide where and how to try to preserve, and where and
how to try to transcend the national.
Historical and sociological research suggests that the most humane of substantive legal
foundations may be ineffectual unless endowed with the necessary structural apparatus to bolster
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substantive ideals.216  Foundational times are periods of hope that institutional constructions can
guide those who will people them in the future.  The dashing of many eighteenth century values
and hopes in the twentieth century may incline one towards the less optimistic view that,
whatever the foundational moments and institutional protections may be, tribalism in human
nature will ensure repeated catastrophes of ever worse proportions as modern technology better
enables mass murder and subjugation.
While each new attempt to perpetuate a humane rule of law must remain experimental
until history provides some perspective on its success, Europe today is an act of faith of our time
that may have the capacity to generate a new social era and a step forward in civilization.217 
Alternatively, if the past and present are not examined more searchingly, Europe may prove
mired in structures whose novelty is superficial, a language of a new vocabulary generated by
unchanged deeper structures of grammar and syntax.218  The EU today is developing strategies of
national and non-national coexistence, with options constrained principally only by the limits of
imagination.  The European mosaic reflects presences of the past and harbingers of the future that
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art18
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may facilitate consideration of similar issues on a larger scale, as law re-members.
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